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be beyond his knowledge, it also assures the defendant that if he can
prove he was not negligent no liability -will attach. Both results are
desirable.
The Kentucky rule might be criticized in that recovery would be
allowed plaintiff in spite of the fact that defendant proved he was
not negligent.
The federal rule is soundest of all technically but in actual prac-
tice is likely to result in injustice to a plaintiff who might be totally
unable to prove the particulars of defendant's negligence after the dis-
sipation of the general presumption.
The Massachusetts rule places plaintiff.in a position where, even
though the defendant may have been guilty of gross negligence, plaintiff
will be denied recovery because he is in no position to prove the par-
ticular acts of defendant.
ROBERT EDWIN HATTON, JR.
TRUSTs-THE CREATION OF A TRUST BY THE USE OF PRECATORY
WORDS.
At the outset, suffice it to say, that the particular type of trusts
dealt with in this brief note are those that are created wholly by
testamentary disposition of property, and not those trusts which arise
upon a conveyance inter-vivos.
As the foundation of our study a recent decision by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has been chosen, which shall hereinafter be termed
the Williams case. Williams, et al. v. Williams' Committee, et al. 253
Ky. 30 (1934). The will in the Williams case contained the follow-
ing language: "I will to my wife all my property to be hers abso-
lutely. It is my desire and I request she will to her people one-half
of my property and to my people the. other one half". These words
were deemed sufficient to constitute a trust. The question now for
our consideration is whether the court acted properly in so holding.
To begin, let us consider only the last sentence without regarding
the first in which the property is given to the wife absolutely. The
writer is of the opinion that even in this instance the words are not
sufficient to show that the testator intended to create enforceable
duties by the use of such precatory words. To hold otherwise would
reach a result in direct conflict with the modern trend of the courts.
However, if such a result had been obtained a century or two ago in
an English jurisdiction it would probably have been correct. Harding
v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469 (1739). Although even prior to this it was stated
by the court in Palmer v. Sehibb, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 291, pl. 9, where "J. S.
devises the residue of his estate to his wife, and desires her to give
all her estate at her death to his or her relations" that if testator had
desired his wife by his will to give at her death all the estate which
he had devised to her, to his or her relations, there the estate devised
to her ought to go after her death to his and her relations." But,
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since the testator's intention was not clear, the court held there was in
fact -no trust created. We have stated enough of the opinion to
show that whether or not a trust is raised depends solely upon the
intention manifested by the will.
Hence, The Restatement of The Law of Trusts. Tentative Draft
No. 11, Section 37, provides: "No trust is created unless the settlor
manifests an intention to create enforceable duties". Mr. Scott, au-
thor of the Restatement, states in the comments to the above sectiun,
"that in determining the intention of the settlor the following circum-
stances among others are considered. (1) The imperative or prec-
atory character of the words used; (2) The definiteness or indefinite-
ness of the property; (3) The definiteness or indefiniteness of the
beneficiary or of the extent of his interest; (4) The xelations between
the parties; (5) The financial situation of the parties; (6) The mo-
tives which may reasonably be supposed to have influenced the settlor
in making the disposition; (7) Whether the result reached by con-
struing the transaction as a trust would be such as a person in the
situation of the settlor would naturally desire to produce". This note
will deal only with subdivision (1), viz., The imperative or precatory
character of the words used.
In Harding v. Glyn, supra, the decision was based upon the "in-
tention" of the testator because the court said, "there are not technical
words in a will, but the manifest intent of the testator is to take
place. . . ." However, it seems that the Williams case, supra, is a
great deal stronger than what we have been talking about, since in
one clear sentence the testator gave to his wife "absolutely".
At this juncture it seems proper to insert a portion of the decision
of Ross, J. in In re Humphrey's Estate, 1 I. R.'21 (1915) as follows:
"The testator in clear words gives all his property to his wife, and
appoints her executrix. He then expresses a wish that she should
dispose of it in a certain way for the benefit of his children. I am
sure the testator himself would have been amazed if the mere ex-
pression of his wish for the guidance of his wife should have the
effect of creating a legal obligation of the strictest character, tying up
all the property and preventing .her from providing for any children
that might be born after the making of the will. After a devise and
bequest in clear and explicit terms, if a trust is intended to be created
one would expect that this would be done in terms equally clear and
explicit. When we come to consider the innumerable decisions in
which the Courts of equity have displayed their benevolent astuteness
in imposing an obligatory meaning upon words merely expressive of
desire, the mind is reduced to a condition of perplexity and confusion.
Trusts have been held to be created by the following expression:---'I
desire him to give', 'I advise him to settle', 'It is my dying request',
'It is my will and desire', "1 recommend', 'Well knowing', and such
like. All these one would think impose at most a moral obligation.
On the other hand, an expression of hope that the devisee would con-
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tInue the estate in the family has been beld to create no trust. I think
it is quite impossible to reconcile the cases. However, that may be,
there is no doubt that the tide has turned and is running strong
against precatory trusts."
Let us now consider a few Kentucky decisions in order to ascertain
whether or not the Williams case is backed by authority. We think
It is not. At the end of the decision in the Wiliams case the court
lists a number of cases affirming the view taken in that case, and
none of which seem to do so upon careful examination. The first is
Major, etc. v. Herndon, 78 Ky. 123 (1879). Here, however, the settlor
did not give the property to his wife "absolutely", but "to my beloved
wife . . .. during her life time or while she remains my widow,
which I desire she shall manage and control for the benefit of herself
and mine and her children." It is obvious that the settlor did intend
to create enforceable duties in this case. In Barrett v. Barrett, 79 Ky.
378 (1881), another case cited In support of the view adopted in the
Williams case, the decision does not express the modern and correct
view. There it is expressly stipulated that "but it is my request (but
not as a condition it'pon which this devise is to take effect) that he
take charge of . . . etc". The court cites from Perry on Trusts,
Section 112, as follows: "Implied trusts are those that arise when
trusts are not directly or expressly declared in terms; but the courts,
from the whole transaction and the words used, imply or infer that
it was the intention of the parties to create a trust. Courts seek for
the intention of the parties, however informal or obscure the language
may be; and if a trust can fairly be implied from the language used
as the intention of the parties, the intention will be executed through
the mediujn of a trustt', In this case, can It fairly be impliel that the
testator intended to create a trust? We think not.
The case of Curd, etc. v. Field, 103 Ky. 293 (1898), appears to be
in harmony with the modern view. There the testator provided: "I
then will all my land or farm to my son, John C. Curd, to do with
as he may think "proper, requiring him to pay my little niece, Bessie
Curd Field $500.00 when she arrives at the age of twenty-one or when
vhe gets married." Nothing appearing to modify or change the con-
text of this provision, there is no doubt but that it was the intention
to fix upon the property given to John C. Curd an enforceable duty to
the extent of $500.00. In the next case, Whittingham v. Schofields
Trustees, 23 Ky. L. R.. 2444, the will provides: "The object of'this be-
quest is not only to make a provision for the said Martha, but enable
her to assist in the support of her father and mother . . . . as long
as they shall live, and this duty I strictly enjoin upon her". Again
it is very plain that the settlor intended to create a trust.
It will be noticed that all the cases cited here are comparatively
old and the last case is fairly recent. Notwithstanding this, none of
them can rightfully be cited as upholding the view reached in the
Williams case.
STUDENT Noa'Ts
In the case of Shaver v. Weddington, et al., 247 Ky. 248 (1932)
the will provided: "Then I request that she divide any earnings
she and I have accumulated during our marriage between her people
and mine, either by gift or by will as she may deem proper". The
court said in construing this passage, "We have a line of cases holding
that, where property has been devised absolutely, any limitation sought
to be imposed upon its disposition or provision repugnant to the fee,
will be .construed as void." This seems to be absolutely binding and
should have formed the basis of a, different result in the Williams case.
An exceedingly well written opinion and one which reviews most
of the former cases is Wells v. Jewell, 232 Ky. 92, where the devisee
is given unlimited power to dispose of property, it is generally placed
in this class as being a devise in fee.
Consequently, from the above statements, it is almost impossible
to see wherein the court found sufficient ground upon which to base the
decision of the Williams case.
H. W. VINcENT.
CRImINAL LW-RiGnT TO WAIvE Juit TRIAL OVER THE OBJCTIO
OF THE STATE's ATTomY.
In the recent case of The People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 179
N. B. 909 (1931) the defendant pleaded not guilty to an indictment for
murder and moved for a trial without a jury. The state's attorney
objected to this motion and moved that the cause be tried.by a jury.
The court sustained the latter motion. Upon being convicted, the de-
fendant appealed and claimed that.the court erred in refusing to hear
the case without a jury. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
decision of the lower court and thereby refused to allow the accused
to waive his constitutional right of trial by jury.
There are three very important problems raised by the case. (1)
What is the effect of the motion by the accused to waive his right of
trial by jury? (2) Must the state's attorney always agree that the
jury be waived? (3) May the court use its own discretion in allowing
the jury to be waived in criminal cases? These questions are dis-
cussed in the light of legislative silence and under a constitution
which contains the usual wording that "The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate".
It has become well established by a long line of decisions that
the constitutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury may be
waived by the accused at his election. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 1
Melcalf (Ky.) 365 (1858); State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878);
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 74 L. Ed. 855 (1929); People v.
Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930). In all of these cases there
was either an agreement between the accused and the prosecuting at-
torney to waive the jury or a statute allowing the same. The Scor-
navache case was decided on the theory that the right to waive a trial
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